This article uses Peirce's Critical Common-sensism to conduct social critical inquiry into racism and “colorblindness” in the U.S. I argue that “colorblindness” discourse - in its sincere, but naïve form - is an enactment of paper-doubt, where racist common-sense beliefs are supposedly eradicated, but still function unintentionally. I offer a Peircean challenge to the common dismissal of people of color's testimony regarding the prevalence of racism. Since people of color experience racism-based secondness often not experienced by whites, their testimony must (...) be embraced as indispensable to the elimination of racist belief-habits. (shrink)

The purpose of this paper is to expose a problem of application in John Rawls’ theory of justice. An examination of his treatment of the application of his principles in A Theory of Justice reveals an insensitivity toward the proper representation of minorities and women. This problem, which is rooted in Rawls’ conception of the relevant social position is not properly addressed by him, yet is grounded in inconsistencies which undermine the just practical implementation of his theory. A provisional solution (...) to this problem is to provide the original position with historical information, as well as to place within its jurisdiction the application of the two principles of justice. (shrink)

A post-Darwinian conception of feeling and emotion is necessary in order to better appreciate the embodied, personalized, and socialized nature of cognition in Peirce's late 1860's Journal of Speculative Philosophy "cognition series." Peirce both distinguishes between and renders synonymous the terms "feeling" and "emotion," a fruitful ambiguity that underscores how easily one's process of thinking can be influenced by idiosyncratic concerns. My reading of this series is a proactive one in which I employ the work of Antonio Damasio to highlight (...) the implicit post-Darwinian embodiment themes in this series. (shrink)